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Abstract
We perform stochastic microsimulations of the dynamics of England and Wales population
after the British referendum on EU membership, considering different possible outcomes.
Employing available survey data, we model the demographics of the region over the next
generation, as shaped by births, deaths and international migration. The migration patterns
between England and Wales and the remaining EU countries are modified according to the
possible scenarios of their future relations. We find that Brexit will accelerate the overall
population ageing and the deepening imbalance between workers and retirees but reduce the
population growth and the fraction of women of reproductive age. In the alternative scenarios
of remaining in the EU these effects will be partially forestalled by the influx of immigrants
from current and prospective EU countries and their children. In all considered scenarios the
native British population declines. Our study demonstrates that microsimulations can be a
useful tool for designing and evaluating the country’s policies in the advent of fundamental
transformations.
1 Introduction
The debate over Britain’s possible exit from the European Union (Brexit) in the run-up to the
referendum on 23 June 2016 has brought up several questions about the changing demographics of
the country and their socioeconomic implications. The rich multiethnic, multicultural structure of
the UK society has been historically shaped by several waves of economically motivated migration,
the last of which began after the accession of Eastern European countries to the EU in 2004.
Similarly, the referendum decision will influence its future composition through population shifts
in migration patterns between Britain and the rest of the EU.
In this work we compare the impact of different policy scenarios on the England and Wales
(E&W) demographics, covering different referendum outcomes and subsequent relationships with
the EU described in the next section. To this end, we perform microsimulations [1–5] of a rep-
resentative sample of E&W population (stratified by age, sex and ethnicity) tracking individual
histories (births, pregnancies, path-dependent migration and deaths) of its members from 1991 to
2041 and varying their migration patterns after Brexit. The initial state and stochastic processes
driving its dynamics are calibrated against data taken from the UK Censuses, birth and death
registrations, International Passenger Survey and Labour Force Survey conducted by the Office
for National Statistics (ONS), as described in detail in Sec. 3. We analyse the implications of the
scenarios for the future age, sex and ethnic structure of E&W population, and estimate its basic
socioeconomic indicators in Sec. 4.
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2 Microsimulation scenarios
The five simulated scenarios depend predominantly on whether the UK remains in or leaves the
EU and affect the migration patterns of native British and EU immigrants as follows:
Remain scenarios
• Status quo extrapolates current population and migration trends.
• 2nd enlargement describes the UK remaining in the EU and subsequent additional inflow
of immigration after the accession of new countries.
Brexit scenarios
• Soft Brexit assumes an amicable parting of the ways between Britain and the EU. Their
relations do not change significantly and the migration flows experience only slight changes.
• Exodus envisions a significant ebb of EU immigrants from the UK, with an accompanying
slight drop in British emigration from the country and a minor increase of their repatriation
from the EU.1
• Hard Brexit leads to drastically limited migration between the UK and the EU after Brexit
as many migrants lose the right of residence or decide to return to their country of origin.
Each scenario involves the following migration flows to and from the country:
1) Inflow of EU immigrants The outcome of the Brexit referendum and further EU en-
largement affect the migration flows of non-British EU citizens. We assume that they will return
to levels from before 2004 after Brexit takes place in 2019 (i.e. 2 years after formally announcing
the intention to withdraw from the Union, in accordance with the Treaty on European Union).
If it is otherwise, they will maintain their current trends to the end of simulation; additionally, if
new countries (including Turkey and Western Balkans) join the EU by the oft-cited year of 2020,
a new wave of immigration will occur, raising the current migration flows between E&W and the
remaining EU countries by a factor fEnl for 10 following years.
2) Outflow of EU immigrants After Brexit, a part of the EU immigrants living in E&W
will return to their country of origin. We expect that this ‘exodus’ will start 2 years after the
referendum and last another 2 years. Depending on the scenario different fraction fEx of this
group will leave during this period. Additionally, those who will have arrived closer to the Brexit
date will leave first (last-in-first-out instead of random selection). The exodus will not involve the
immigrants arriving after Brexit.
3) Outflow of native British to the EU About 30% of British emigration is destined for
other EU countries [6], either for work or retirement. We assume that this outflow will be reduced
by Brexit by a factor fEm.
4) Inflow of native British from the EU Brexit may start a wave of returns of British
emigrants living in other EU countries. We model it by increasing their repatriation to E&W by a
factor fRet. We assume that the process will begin 2 years after the referendum and last 2 years.
The values of the simulation parameters for the above scenarios (Table 1) are surmised from
the ONS data, in particular the International Passenger Survey. They are discussed in detail in
Sec. 3.5.
3 Methods and data
3.1 Microsimulation engine
Our microsimulation engine employed in this study generates the stochastic evolution of a complex
system through path-dependent dynamics of individual agents controlled by initial conditions, dif-
ferent values of attributes and exogenous factors. It supports the dynamic addition and removal
of agents (such as births and deaths of persons), their transitions (e.g.migration between the EU
1A comparison of this scenario with the Remain scenarios can test the common perception among the Leave
campaigners that if the UK remains in the EU its population will increase by 2–3 million by 2030.
2
fEnl fEx fEm fRet
Status quo 100% 0% 100% 0%
2nd enlargement 200% 0% 100% 0%
Soft Brexit 0% 10% 80% 10%
Exodus 0% 70% 80% 10%
Hard Brexit 0% 70% 30% 80%
Table 1: Microsimulation parameters for post-referendum scenarios.
and E&W), time-dependent interactions between agents (e.g. links between mothers and children),
memory (e.g. last-in-first-out migration or course of pregnancy), as well as other features not used
in this project, such as multi-level simulations, correlated and dynamically changing control vari-
ables, or coupling to a reservoir with a possible feedback mechanism. The flexible engine design
facilitates building microsimulation models for forecasting, scenario analysis and intervention test-
ing. The numerical code is written in modern C++ and runs on Windows and Linux. It provides
an object-oriented application programming interface (API) which can be used to independently
implement additional microsimulation features.
3.2 Microsimulation model for forecasting the E&W demographics un-
der different EU membership scenarios
We have built the stochastic dynamic microsimulation model for forecasting changes of the E&W
demographics under different scenarios of future relations with the EU. It combines the headship
rate method (enforcing a given distribution, conditional or not, of a particular variable in the
population at given time; used to model birth multiplicity and sex of newborn children) [5] and
transition matrix method (applying transition probabilities to change the state of an individual
member; used to model e.g.mortality) [5, 7] to model the evolution of the population. Since
our model describes the dynamics of many cohorts at the same time, it can be classified as a
cross-sectional dynamic microsimulation [5]. Compared with other popular dynamic demographic
models [5, 8–13], ours is quite simple: focusing on natural growth and migration, it does not
describe any economic variables (income, wealth or labour force participation) or educational
attainment, while the household formation is only partially addressed as mother-child links. The
treatment of migration is similar to the one in the MOSARTmodel [5] with additional stratification
by ethnic group. The structure of our model and the data it uses are described in the following
parts of this section.
We model the E&W population from 1 July 1991 to 1 July 2041 with a quarterly time step.
The initial sample contains 5 million persons, which is approximately 10% of the population as
measured by the 1991 UK Census. Each of its members is characterised by fixed attributes,
i.e. date of birth (the daily precision minimises the time discretisation error), sex (male or female)
and ethnicity (one of 18 ethnic groups according to the ONS classification used in the 2011 UK
Census). Their values are drawn randomly from the three-dimensional distribution of sex, age
(tabulated in five-year groups: 0-4, 5-9, . . . , 85 and over) and ethnicity reported by the Census.
The early start date serves to generate realistic life histories of individual persons, in particular
building up immigrant and emigrant stock in preparation for Brexit modelling (the starting sample,
while reflecting accurately the sex, age and ethnic structure, does not contain any immigrants,
emigrants or mothers).
Life events, such as births, pregnancies, migration and deaths, are described by stochastic
processes. Their parameters are calibrated to the following ONS data sources: birth rates, birth
multiplicities and child sex ratios to E&W births registrations [15–17], ethnicity adjustment factors
for birth rates to Labour Force Survey [18], and mortality rates to E&W deaths registrations
and population estimates [19, 20]. Migration rates are calculated based on UK Censuses (1991,
2001 and 2011) [14] and compared against International Passenger Survey [6] as sanity check.
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For the purpose of this study, we identify the population of native British with White British
and Irish groups of the Census ethnic classification and the immigrants from current and future
EU accession countries with Other White group (thus neglecting the impact of Brexit on the
immigration from outside of the EU, the assumption we take into account when choosing the values
of factors modifying the migration parameters in different scenarios in Table 1). The analysed
microsimulation scenarios alter the migration patterns between E&W and the EU as described in
Sec. 2.
The full history of each person (including links between mothers and children) is by default
preserved in memory throughout the simulation run, enabling us to model path-dependent de-
mographic mechanisms with arbitrarily long memory or retrieve any additional information. We
save to disk the numbers of all life events and the size of each sex, age in five-year intervals and
ethnicity group. A single run for a sample simulated in this model takes approximately 10 hours
on a standard PC and requires 4GB of RAM. The following parts of this section provide more
modelling details.
3.3 Births
We model births as resulting from pregnancies which are triggered by a non-homogeneous Poisson
process with memory, with intensity (conception rate) dependent on the woman’s age, year of
birth and time since last childbirth (the probability of becoming pregnant again is set to zero for
three months after giving birth). For simplicity, every pregnancy is assumed to be successful. The
conception rate is calibrated to historical data on birth rates by woman’s age (in years, from 15
to 45) and year of birth of woman [15] and multiplicity (one or two) by five-year age group and
year [17]. If birth rate for a given year of birth and age is yet unknown (e.g. women born after
1999), we use the latest available birth rate for women of the same age. Next the conception rate
for each major E&W ethnic group (White British, Other White, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi,
Chinese, African and Caribbean) is rescaled by the time-dependent ratio of total fertility rate
(TFR) for this ethnic group to the average TFR of the whole population (the TFR data are
extrapolated flat forward) [21,22]. We assume that TFR for the remaining ethnic groups is equal
to the average (since they comprise less than 4% of the total population, the error introduced in
this way is small).
The simulation preserves the information about the mother-child relationship. New children
are assigned mother’s ethnic group, while their sex is randomly drawn from a time-dependent
two-point distribution based on historical data on the number of male and female births [16].
The employed pregnancy model, extensible to general epidemiological applications, enables
us to generate more realistic childbearing histories and, in consequence, reduce the error of our
results. Assuming an effective minimum one year interval (9 months of pregnancy and 3 months
of postpartum infertility) between births, we reduce the variance of their number per woman.
Modelling births as a simple Poisson process with arbitrarily small intervals between births would
lead to the same mean, but a significantly higher variance, and hence larger Monte Carlo errors
in the simulation.
3.4 Mortality
Mortality is modelled as a non-homogeneous Poisson process with mortality rate dependent on
sex, age and year of birth. Thus, differences in mortality between ethnic groups result from their
different sex and age structure. We calibrate the mortality curves, i.e. mortality rates as a function
of age for given year of birth and sex of person, to annual data on mortality rates by sex and five-
year age group [19,20]. If all or part of data points are not available for any cohort, we copy them
from the closest cohort for which the data are known (e.g. if the last known data on mortality
rate of 80-year-old men is for a cohort born in 1930, we use this mortality rate also for men
born in 1931). Differently to some other authors [23] and consistent with recent observations [24],
we do not assume that the decline in age-specific mortality rates observed so far will continue
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indefinitely in the future. Mortality rate for a given cohort is a piecewise constant function of age
with five-year intervals until the age of 90, beyond which it is extrapolated flat.
3.5 Migration
Given the lack of migration data for different ethnic groups in the E&W population,2 we model
it based on the decennial census data from 1991, 2001 and 2011 [14] in the following way:
1. For each decade [y, y + 10] between censuses, where y = 1991 or 2001, we carry out the
simulation without any migration, and record the population composition by sex, age and
ethnicity on the 1 July of years y and y + 10. Next, we rescale each recorded population by
the ratio of the historic to simulated E&W population size from 1 July y.
2. For each five-year birth cohort i with given sex and ethnicity in census year y we collect the
following quantities:
nyi – the size of cohort i obtained from the simulation in step 1 in year y,
n′yi – the size of the corresponding group censused in year y,
ny+10,i – the size of cohort i after 10 years,
n′y+10,i – the size of the corresponding group censused in year y + 10.
3. We estimate the net migration based on the mid-year census data in the period between 1
July y year and 1 July y + 10 year in the above cohort using the formula (n′y+10,i − n
′
yi)−
(ny+10,i − nyi). The positive sign indicates immigration and negative emigration.
The net migration rate ki in each cohort can be modelled either as relative, dni/dt = kini,
or absolute, dni/dt = ki. We assume that the first is better suited for describing the emigration
of dominant (native) ethnic groups from an economically and politically stable country, where no
substantial push factors affect the probability of moving abroad. In contrast, the second describes
more realistically the migration of ethnic minorities, which is mainly driven by sentiments or
various factors in the country of origin (e.g. the inflow of Polish workers after 2004). Accordingly,
we use the relative rate to model the emigration of White British and Irish from E&W and the
absolute rate to model the emigration and immigration of the remaining, smaller ethnic groups
(such as Other White), as well as the repatriation of White British and Irish. From the above
formulas, we obtain the relative net migration rate ki = log(1 + ∆mi/ni)/∆t and the absolute
rate ki = ∆mi/∆t for each cohort i, where ni is the size of the cohort at the beginning of ∆t
period and ∆mi is a net migration level over time ∆t.
Simulating the net migration may obscure the true scale, structure and dynamics of migration
flows in the population (e.g. a large number of emigrants may offset a large number of immigrants),
as noted in e.g. [25]. We partially ameliorate these problems by using a fine stratification of cohorts
(by age in five-year intervals, sex and ethnicity) when calibrating migration rates.
In the simulation, we apply the obtained ki values to each cohort over time ∆t, to calculate
∆mi = ni(e
ki∆t − 1) or ∆mi = max(ki∆t,−ni) in this group for relative and absolute rates,
respectively. Beyond the last census date, extant and new persons are split in groups by five-year
age intervals, sex and ethnicity, and assigned the net migration rates of corresponding groups from
year 2006 (halfway between the 2001 and 2011 Censuses) in the “Status quo” scenario. We modify
these rates in other scenarios described in Sec. 2.
2International Passenger Survey measures immigration/emigration, source/destination countries and the nation-
ality of migrants, but does not record their ethnicity. Therefore, we cannot combine it with UK Censuses—our
main and the most complete source of data on the demographics of E&W population, which measure ethnicity,
but not nationality. For simplicity, we calibrate our model to net migration calculated based on the Census data,
adapting the analytical method used in Ref. [21]. It is worth noting that the net migration figures obtained from our
microsimulation agree with the results of the cited work, e.g., for White British group we obtain the net migration
in years 2001–2011 of -1.47% of the initial (2001) population compared to -1.51% in the cited work and for Indian
group we obtain 22.91% compared to 21.5%.
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Emigrants and immigrants are selected randomly from each five-year birth, sex and ethnicity
cohort. White British and Irish emigrants are moved to an auxiliary emigrant population, which
is simulated in parallel to the E&W population using the same assumptions about births and
mortality, but without further migration; it serves to simulate a more realistic age and sex struc-
ture of the native British emigrants returning to E&W in the simulated post-Brexit scenarios.
Immigrants are cloned to create new persons who are added to the E&W population. All children
below the age of 10 migrate together with their mothers.
We modify the above migration dynamics by factors from Table 1 to account for different post-
referendum scenarios. The “Status quo” case extrapolates obtained trends without any changes.
In the “2nd enlargement” the net migration levels of Other White are multiplied by the fEnl
parameter between 2020 (the next considered EU enlargement by countries with Other White
majority) and 2030, reflecting the increase in the migration flows in this group, and then come
back to the state from 2016. In all Brexit scenarios, starting from the Brexit date (set to 1 July
2019, which is the closest date in the microsimulation schedule to the official one), the emigration of
White British and Irish drops by the factor fEm, while the fraction fRet of the auxiliary population
of native British emigrants returns to E&W over the following two years. (Since the available data
force us to work with net migration rather than separate immigration and emigration figures, it is
important to note that changes of emigration rates generally correspond to larger relative changes
of net migration, possibly even changing its sign. For this reason, the fEm values must be very high
to account for realistic shifts in emigration. Additionally, fRet must be increased to compensate for
the fact that the stock of native British emigrants to the EU accumulated in the microsimulation
course does not include people who emigrated before 1991.) At the same time, the net migration of
Other White returns to the levels from 2000 (before the 2004 EU enlargement) and the exodus of
this group begins, during which the fraction fEx of this group leaves E&W over the following two
years. The exodus is modelled using the last-in-first-out algorithm. It assumes that the newest EU
immigrants, who have spent less time in E&W, have not yet formed strong bond with their new
country and kept more ties with their country of origin, which makes them more willing and able
of all EU immigrants to return. Furthermore, any right to remain granted by the UK government
to EU immigrants after Brexit is likely to depend on how long they have been residing in the
country.
3.6 Error and stability analysis
Sampling error A single person in the simulated population represents approx. 10 real persons
in E&W. This sample size reduction causes the results to be less reliable for small groups (e.g. 70-
75-year-old Chinese males). To estimate the sampling error for the fractional values (size of a
group relative to the total population), at each future time t we assume that the observed fraction
of people belonging to a given group is drawn from a multinomial distribution. The parameters
of this distribution are estimated within a Bayesian framework, using a flat Dirichlet prior and
assuming that each observation (a person) is independent (this is not strictly true, because the last-
in-first-out migration algorithm used in migration modelling and the migration of children together
with mothers introduces correlations between population members, but it simplifies the estimation
of the sampling error). The relative sampling error for ethnic, age and sex groups is negligibly
small thanks to the large sample size (5 million). Estimation of the relative sampling error for
the total population size would require performing bootstrapping (repeating the simulation run
200–300 times), which is not economical. However, we expect this error to be negligible owing to
the large size of the simulated sample.
Sensitivity to input parameters We carry out sensitivity analysis with respect to the scenario
parameters fEx, fEm, fRet and fEnl by perturbing them up and down by 5%. We expect the
impact of these parameters on the final results to be approximately linear. Since fEm and fRet
affect the same segment of the population (White British and Irish), they need to be perturbed
both separately and together to test the linearity assumption. An example of sensitivities to the
microsimulation parameter fEnl is presented in Fig. 1. The chart shows that the immigration flows
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in years 2020–30 can be accurately controlled by this parameter as the sensitivity to it is precisely
zero before this period and then starts to fluctuate around zero as a result of the Monte Carlo
error.
We do not combine the sampling errors, calculated as described in the previous section, with
the error resulting from the sensitivity to (unknown precisely) scenario parameters, because our
goal is to illustrate a range of possible outcomes, not to predict the most likely one.
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Figure 1: Sensitivity (two-sided numerical derivative for ±5% perturbation, right axis) of quar-
terly immigration flow (left axis) for Other White ethnic group to fEnl parameter in the “2nd
enlargement” microsimulation scenario. The wiggles result from the Monte Carlo sampling error.
4 Results
4.1 Total size of the E&W population
Differences in population size between the considered scenarios become apparent within a few
years, as shown in Fig. 2, confirming the significant influence of Britain’s EU membership on
its demographic structure. The E&W population growth is fuelled by extending lifespan and
immigration along with the higher fertility rate of immigrant women. Brexit will abate, but
not halt it (see insert). The ONS estimates obtained by a static extrapolation called “cohort
component method” [26], included for comparison, are slightly higher than our “Status quo”
prediction.
4.2 Median age
The future median age of E&W population rises in all simulated scenarios, as presented in Fig. 3.
The trend concerns almost all sex and ethnic groups, except the EU immigrants in the “2nd
enlargement” case, where it is inverted by the wave of young immigrants from new accession
countries. In all Brexit scenarios the median age of the EU immigrant population is expected to
increase sharply, as those who arrived last to E&W and thus are more likely to return to their
country of origin are on average younger than the earlier immigration and, at the same time, the
inflow of new EU immigrants is reduced. Consequently, this segment of the E&W population,
which was unusually young in 2016, will see its median age rise much faster than other ethnic
groups, which were already significantly older.
Since women constitute 53-55% of the EU immigrant population (in particular, 52.5-56.5% of
the 0-29 age group), the post-Brexit immigrant exodus will affect the female median age more
than the male one. This effect will be enhanced by the sex gap in life expectancy. Alongside
the declining fertility rates, the departure of young female EU immigrants at the peak of their
reproductive age will further accelerate the E&W population ageing through a declining birth
rate.
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Figure 2: Total size of the E&W population under different EU membership scenarios and the
ONS projections [26]. The dip after 2019 in the “Exodus” scenario is caused by the large-scale
outflow of the EU immigrants. Inset: differences in the population size between the “Status quo”
and other scenarios.
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Figure 3: Change in the median age of female, male and total E&W population between 2016 and
2036 under different scenarios for native British, EU immigrants and the remaining ethnic groups
(“others”).
4.3 Women of reproductive age and male to female ratio
The percentage of women of reproductive age (15-45) in the E&W population is expected to fall
in all considered scenarios (Fig. 4a), which will negatively impact the natural growth. As pointed
out in the previous section, Brexit reduces their number sharply because of the specific age and
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sex structure of the EU immigrant group, namely younger and with higher share of women than
the E&W average. Consequently, the male to female ratio in the total population will increase,
as presented in Fig. 4b. The overall ageing of E&W society imposes the same trends, although
milder, on the “Status quo” scenario. They can be offset by higher rates of immigration after the
future EU enlargement.
All scenarios reveal two periods in which the number of women of reproductive age and their
share in the E&W population increase: the opening decade of this century and years 2028–2036.
The first is caused by the 2004 EU enlargement and the ensuing flow of immigrants from Eastern
Europe, while the latter by their children entering the reproductive age. The resultant past and
forthcoming small “baby booms” partially ameliorate the population ageing, without significantly
encumbering the dependency ratio lowered by their parents (see Secs. 4.2 and 4.4).
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Figure 4: a) Percentage of women of reproductive age in the total E&W population and b) male
to female ratio under the considered EU membership scenarios.
4.4 Dependency ratios
Figure 5a displays the relationship between dependents (children and elderly) and the working-
age group (ages 15-64). Their proportion, i.e. the dependency ratio (solid line, left axis), exhibits
a large dip from 2001 to 2011, caused by the simultaneous decrease in the fertility rate and
the influx of EU workers. The latter also explains the flattening of the old age dependency
ratio (of retirement-age to working-age persons; dashed line, right axis) in this period. After the
influx subsides, and the female EU immigrants start having children, both curves pick up their
previous upward trends. From 2019 onwards, the scenarios fan out, depicting differences between
the migration patterns: Remain scenarios yield lower ratios than Brexit ones, in particular the
dependency ratio ranges from a low of 0.62 under the “2nd enlargement” scenario to a high of 0.65
under the “Exodus” scenario in 2041, whereas the old-age dependency ratio from 0.34 to 0.38. All
curves flatten after 2036, when “baby boomers” (see Sec. 4.3) enter the workforce.
The divergence between the analysed scenarios is mainly driven by working-age EU immigrants
(see Fig. 5b). From 2016 to 2036, their number doubles if E&W remains in the EU, maintains a
similar level after “Soft Brexit”, and almost halves in the radical Brexit scenarios. The number of
children of EU immigrants grows proportionately to the working-age group in Remain scenarios,
but it shrinks faster than this group after Brexit as a result of the reduced inflow of young EU
immigrant women; all scenarios predict a similar size of the elderly group through 2036.
Comparing the proportions of age groups in Fig. 5b shows that the EU immigrant population
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referendum and, following different EU membership scenarios, in 2036.
is characterised by lower dependency ratios than the native British one. The continued ageing of
the latter (see Sec. 4.2) additionally contributes to the overall growth of dependency ratios in the
total E&W population.
4.5 Population pyramid in 2036
Population pyramids for all considered EU membership scenarios have the shape characteristic
of an ageing society, as shown in Fig. 6 for the E&W population in 2016 and 2036. In Remain
scenarios they have broader lower halves than the Brexit ones owing to the influx of young immi-
grants. However, this broadening does not extend down to the lowest age groups, highlighting the
difference between population change due to natural growth and immigration.
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Figure 6: Population pyramids for E&W in 2016 and 2036 for two opposite EU membership
scenarios (“others” denotes the remaining population, except native British and EU immigrants).
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4.6 Mechanisms of population change 2016–2036
Ethnic composition of the population can change by natural growth and migration. Figure 7
illustrates the contributions of these two factors for the period 2016–2036. In Remain scenarios,
the population grows mainly through immigration from the EU and new accession countries after
the next enlargement. New immigrant women, who will arrive to E&W after 2016, contribute
37% of births to natural growth in this group in the “Status quo” scenario and almost 50% in the
“2nd enlargement” case. In Brexit scenarios, British expats return, but owing to their relatively
small number and predominantly post-reproductive age, they do not counterbalance the negative
natural growth of their ethnic group. Their share in the E&W population shrinks further, even
with the diminished presence of the EU immigrants, owing to high fertility rates of several other
relatively numerous ethnic groups such as Pakistani or Africans. This above-average fertility rate
of non-EU immigrants [21] and the Eastern European “baby boomers” (Sec. 4.3) are the main
factors driving the population growth.
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Figure 7: Changes of the ethnic group population due to natural growth and net migration between
2016 and 2036 in the E&W population for different EU membership scenarios. The number of
all births (indicated by a number where it exceeds the axis range) and births only to women who
immigrate to E&W in that period are shown for White British and Irish (combined), Other White
and several other ethnic groups. The results for ethnic groups unchanged by the scenarios are
displayed only in “Status quo” chart.
5 Conclusions
We have performed stochastic dynamic microsimulations of E&W population to forecast its age,
sex and ethnic structure under different scenarios of the UK membership in the EU with varying
international migration patterns. The differences between Brexit and Remain cases, although
significant, are mostly those of degree. In the constantly growing population, the median age and
dependency ratios will rise, and the percentage of women of reproductive age will fall regardless
of the EU membership status. These changes mostly result from the interplay between longer
lifespans (compared with earlier cohorts) and lower average fertility rates, and could be partially
forestalled by the influx of immigration from current and prospective EU countries and their
children. At the same time, the share of native British in the E&W population will shrink, even
after their repatriation and the exodus of EU immigrants after the Brexit, owing to high fertility
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rates of other ethnic groups. The only qualitative effects brought about by Brexit will be a
temporary population size dip in the “Exodus” scenario, a sharp increase of male to female ratio
after “Hard Brexit” and a significant increase in the median age of EU immigrant group. The above
demographic changes will have important fiscal consequences both on the revenue (lower number
of people of working age) and expenditure (higher medical care costs and fraction of pensioners
offset by lesser demand on school and maternity services) side. Under all considered scenarios,
the E&W demographics will undergo a significant transformation, which can be expected to have
a strong impact on the society and politics. Its exact nature will depend on the UK’s stance on
immigration after Brexit. However, the presented results indicate that alleviating the growing
strain placed by the ageing population on the country’s social services will require additional
interventions.
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